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HENRY R. PIEHLER* * **
In this Article, the authors respond to Professor Henderson's critique of their process
proposal. Although they share some of his concerns, they remain convinced that
scrutinizing the process by which design decisions are made will better promote the
goal of consumer safety.
Professor Henderson has asked some very hard questions. In the
spirit of the Socratic method we shall respond to them by posing other
questions. In the process, we may from time to time divert from the
hoary Socratic tradition by making some affirmative statements, but,
for the most part, we shall be content with tossing some of those red
and white nonpolycentric rocks into his own backyard.
Professor Henderson criticizes our suggested "process defense" on
three grounds: (1) the process defense is subjective and thus nonveri-
fiable;1 (2) the clear and convincing evidence burden to be used to
establish liability when a manufacturer convinces a court that its
"decisionmaking process was comprehensive and well-articulated" is
inappropriate for the resolution of polycentric design defect cases; 3
and (3) manufacturers would be afraid to commit themselves to the
documentation necessary to establish the defense. 4
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1962, Beth Medrash Elyon Research Institute; B.S., 1970, University of Wisconsin; J.D., 1965,
Marquette University.
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See Henderson, Should a "Process Defense" Be Recognized in Design Defect Cases?, 50
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 585, 593-600 (1981) [hereinafter Henderson, Critique].
2 Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability: From
Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 347, 384 (1980).
3 Henderson, Critique, supra note 1, at 600-04.
4 Id. at 606-11.
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It is time for some straight talk. Why have commentatorsz and
legislators6 been clamoring for more specific standards with regard to
design defect litigation? Although we do not doubt Professor Hender-
son's sincere concern with the institutional ability of courts to handle
polycentric litigation, we question whether this rather philosophical
issue is what motivates lawmakers and excites the imagination of the
defense bar in their calls for legislative change. We ask Professor
Henderson whether in his heart of hearts he believes that his proposals
do not themselves suffer from a polycentricity problem. We doubt
that this problem will be made manageable by his own statutory
proposals that permit the establishment of a prima facie design defect
case if the suggested alternative design
could have been adopted by the manufacturer for use at the time
the product in question was manufactured, without causing in-
creases in the costs of production, distribution or use of the prod-
uct, or decreases in the utility of the product, unless such increases
and decreases when taken together are significantly outweighed by
the added safety benefits of such alternative formula or design.7
E.g., Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 643
(1978).
6 E.g., Model Uniform Product Liability Act §§ 104, 107, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,721-26,
62,728-30 (1979); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403 (Cum. Supp. 19S0); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-20A-
4(b)(4) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1980); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.310(2) (Cum. Supp. 19SO).
7 Henderson, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Design: A Proposed Statutory
Reform, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 625, 631 (1978) (emphasis added). This standard has been incorpo-
rated, with minor alterations, in the National Product Liability Act, H.R. 5626, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 5(b)(3), 125 Cong. Rec. H9332 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1979). Professor Henderson worked on
the drafting of this legislation and testified in its favor. Product Liability: Legislative Hearing;
on H.R. 5571, H.R. 5258 (identical bills), H.R. 1061, H.R. 2891, H.R. 4204 (identical bills),
H.R. 1675, H.R. 1676, H.R. 2964, H.R. 5626 (similar bills) Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 818-30 (1979) (statement of James A. Henderson).
In addition to the reservations expressed in the text concerning the proposed legislation, we
question whether juries are more capable of handling a standard that enjoins them to consider
increases in costs and decreases in marketability or utility of a product unless they are -signifi-
cantly outweighed" by added safety benefits. Does the solution to the problem of polycentricity
lie in the phrase "significantly outweighed"? We are doubtful that Professor Henderson can
evade the palycentricity question even if the sole standard would be that set forth in the quoted
section of his proposed statute, which allows for the finding of a defect if the alternative design
would have avoided harm without increasing the costs of buying, using, and consuming the
product. See Henderson, Critique, supra note 1, at 587.
Suppose that a defendant demonstrates that although the suggested alternative might have
prevented the plaintiff's injury, additional hazards are introduced into the product by such an
alternative, hazards that were not present in the product as originally designed. Suppose too,
that although the cost of the altered product might not be "greater," the maintainability,
performance, or useful life are also eroded by such an alternative. Can Professor Henderson
really believe that the polycentricity he abhors has been magically removed by his manageabie"
standard? In fact, we are back to square one, again assessing the polycentrie trade-offs, but in a
vacuum. If Professor Henderson were to respond that the "costs" that must be considered are not
only dollar costs but the kind of costs we have described, then he has mandated a standard that
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We would suggest that the solution commentators, legislators,
and even Professor Henderson have really been looking for is a method
and a rationale for accomplishing greater judicial control of design
defect cases through directed verdict practice. That is what motivates
us as well. All of us who clamor for some change share a deep concern
that too many marginal (close-call) cases have been making their way
to juries. That they do so is the inevitable consequence of focusing
design defect litigation on the reasonableness of a particular design.
The reasonableness standard is one that traditionally belongs to juries
and is rarely subject to significant judicial oversight. This standard is
sufficient for dealing with the single-incident negligence cases. Issues
such as "should the landlord have changed the bulb in the hallway" or
"should the homeowner have repaired his picket fence" are fact-sensi-
tive and do not have a significant impact on the whole of society.
Design defect litigation is different. It speaks not only to the one case,
but to the entirety of a product line and may speak to the safety
practices of an industry. There are justifiable grounds for seeking
some assurance that only bona fide design defect cases find their way
to the jury.
The real question is what kind of trade-offs are to be made for
the relinquishment of jury control of the defect issue. Professor Hen-
derson, who views the world through polycentric glasses, sees no need
for trade-offs. He is satisfied with establishing a standard that pro-
vides for greater specificity and that cuts down on the open-endedness
of the litigation. We believe that together with greater judicial control
over the issue of defect must come greater judicial responsibility to
determine that safety considerations permeated the design process.
We are thus unwilling to cut back on the reasonableness standard
(vague as it may be) unless there is a judicial inquiry into the design
safety review process.
We come now to the question whether our alternative eviden-
tiary standard, which is to be utilized if a court is satisfied that the
safety review process has been exhaustive, is suitable for design defect
litigation. Professor Henderson contends that a clear and convincing
evidence burden will not do as a standard because it does not ade-
quately address the polycentricity of design cases. He thus prefers a
"barely reasonable" standard couched in the "significantly out-
weighed" language set forth above.8
would prevent the consideration of any alternative design. It is simply not probable that any
design alternative will not bring into play advantages and disadvantages in utility, safety,
repairability, and maintenance. We thus believe that even the more radical part of the statute
merely papers over process problems that must be considered.
" If indeed the suggested language would accomplish the desired goal of conferring on trial
courts greater directed verdict power, we would be inclined to accept the Henderson amend-
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We disagree. Professor Henderson ignores the reason we advo-
cate imposition of this higher burden-the belief that a showing of
adequate process should lead to a presumption that a product is not
defective. This presumption should be overcome only in "instances in
which the industry has clearly erred."9  The clear and convincing
standard has a long tradition as the standard utilized in cases in which
courts seek to assure themselves that the evidence is truly persuasive.10
It is a standard addressed to the directed verdict power of a trial court
and is intended as a rigorous standard both at the trial level and at the
appellate review stage. It will, in our opinion, more effectively ac-
complish the goal of creating a higher judicial profile in these cases.
We assume that Professor Henderson would disagree with our
rejoinder. He has made it clear that he believes that the problem is not
the quality of the evidence, but rather the typology of the case. In
fact, he suggests that the more extensive the evidence, the more poly-
centric and unmanageable the case becomes. Since Professor Hender-
son has convinced himself that we have become converted to this view
of design defect litigation, he finds our solution not equal to the
problem.
The short answer to Professor Henderson is that we have yet to
see the light. He has convinced us that polycentricity creates some
litigation problems that deserve careful attention in the more extreme
cases. We remain firm in our opinion that the highly focused nature of
products liability litigation in which safety is the central question
permits the inquiry to go forward in a sensible fashion. Polycentricity
contributes to the phenomenon that design defect questions tend to be
"close-call" questions, but only in part. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to explore the close-call phenomenon in depth." We have
already noted one aspect of design litigation that contributes signifi-
cantly to the closeness of the question. The mere fact that every design
case speaks to an entire product line or an entire industry makes the
decision more difficult. The impact of design litigation is so significant
that it perforce makes what Professor Henderson would call the "lin-
ment to our proposal. It is our guess, however, that a change in the substantive standard is less
likely to accomplish the result. The changed substantive standard is more likely to find its way to
a jury who will now have to ponder the meaning of "significantly outweighed.-
9 Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, supra note 2, at 35S.
10 Id. at 375 n.75.
1 One of the authors (Professor Twerski) intends to explore this problem in depth in an
article to be published in 1982. It is tentatively entitled The New Product Liability No-Duty
Rules: Advancing the Art of Judicial Rulemaking. The article has not yet been committed to any
law review.
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ear" decision hard to make. We would expect a pilot on a bombing
mission to seek greater assurance that he has the appropriate target
when he is dropping an atomic bomb than when he is dropping a
conventional bomb. Design defect litigation is the atom bomb of tort
law. In short, our concern is primarily with linear close-call questions.
However, we would suggest that even given Professor Henderson's
view, our solution is more likely to address the most pressing need,
that of creating greater judicial control through directed verdict prac-
tice.
Given that our stated goal is to accomplish greater judicial con-
trol over design litigation with some assurance that safety consider-
ations have played a significant part in the design review process, it is
understandable that we have structured our test for "good process" as
we did. Professor Henderson is quite right that our test is a subjective
one. It is indeed a "good faith/comprehensive inquiry" standard. 12
Professor Henderson perceptively notes that we avoided use of the
word "reasonable" to define "process." It could not have been a more
intentional omission.
We debated among ourselves as to whether "reasonableness"
should be used to describe the standard for the safety review process.
Professor Henderson concludes that we struck reasonableness from the
process definition because to include it would involve the courts in a
polycentric balancing question. 13 As we noted, polycentricity was
not the problem central to our deliberations.
Why did we avoid describing the desired standard for the safety
review process as "reasonable"? First, as noted above, we sought a
test that would place decisionmaking responsibility in the hands of the
judiciary. The reasonableness question is traditionally for the jury.
Second, reasonableness connotes a minimum standard of societal ac-
ceptability. We were intent on establishing a test that would require
an exhaustive, rigorous, and well-documented approach to safety
review. The reasonableness concept has a long and checkered history.
Far better to avoid its use when one is seeking to impose a high
standard of responsibility. Third, by creating a test administered by
the court, we were focusing on classic duty doctrine within the law of
torts. By placing its imprimatur on the design safety review process, a
court will be telling American industry how exhaustive the process
must be before it passes muster. This is a high-level policy decision to
be made by a court and can only be made at a subjective level. Many
12 See Henderson, Critique, supra note 1, at 593 nn.43, 45.
,3 Id. at 590-91.
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years ago Dean Prosser expressed the opinion that it would not be easy
to determine when a duty of reasonable care came into being. He
said:
It should be understood at the outset that there is no magic in
"duty." It is merely a word with which the court states its conclu-
sion that there is no liability; and it means whatever the court
wants it to mean in the particular case. No general formula ever
has been devised to state when there is, and when there is not, a
duty in negligence cases; and it is very likely that none ever will be.
This is because considerations of social policy vary depending on
the precise issue before the court and social policy questions always
underlie the duty issue. 14
Fourth, and perhaps most important under our process defense, a
judge is not simply charged with identifying good process. The ques-
tion is whether, in the judge's opinion, the process is sufficiently
exhaustive to warrant removing the case from the reasonableness
standard and subjecting it to a clear and convincing standard. The
court is thus not asking the process question in a vacuum. It is making
a choice between standards.
We believe that this last factor has great significance with regard
to Professor Henderson's concern that the subjective process standard
is nonverifiable. A manufacturer is not guaranteed a free ride if he
meets the process standard. Since the manufacturer has documented
his choices, he will now have to defend them against the clear and
convincing standard. The insurance policy against a "paper" safety
review process is that the substantive decision of the manufacturer
must be defended.' 5
Professor Henderson, we believe, would conclude that we have
created a Catch-22. If the clear and convincing test is honestly ap-
plied, then almost all design defect cases are doomed to failure. He
believes that polycentric cases, by definition, are too close to call. The
closeness will render the process test nonverifiable. On the other
hand, if the test is not rigorously applied, we would simply slip back
to polycentric decisionmaking.
We disagree. A defendant who identifies a hazard or an alterna-
tive design disregards that information at his peril. His protection
14 W. Prosser, J. Wade & V. Schwartz, Cases and Materials on Torts 405 (6th ed. 1976).
Is The fact that our proposal holds the defendant accountable for design decisions that are
clearly not defensible differentiates this proposal from the NEPA aspirational mandates de-
scribed by Professor Henderson, Henderson, Critique, supra note 1, at 597-9S. Unlike the
environmental situation, a manufacturer must be concerned about a substantive decision that is
perceived to be clearly wrong after the fact.
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against recovery is a higher evidentiary standard. That protection is
meaningful because it lies in the hands of a trial judge who seeks to
protect manufacturers against legitimate close-call cases. Admittedly,
that protection is only as strong as the resolve of the trial judge to
direct verdicts honestly. But, dependence on the judge remains
whether the method for judicial control is substantively oriented (as
Professor Henderson would have it) or procedurally oriented (under
our proposal). If, however, Professor Henderson would agree that a
test can be fashioned that sharpens the definition of defect so that it is
less polycentric, then has he not answered his own question with
regard to the nonverifiability of the design safety review process?
Professor Henderson also has expressed concern that the process
defense is dangerous to a defendant because, by exposing its process, it
provides the plaintiff with the ammunition to defeat it should it fail to
establish the defense. 16 By the same token, the defendant provides
this same ammunition if it establishes the process defense. A higher or
more specific evidentiary standard helps protect the defendant. Once
the specific danger of the product has been identified and the alterna-
fives have been examined at trial, the defendant will likely have
produced sufficient proof of having seriously "considered" the prob-
lem. This focus will provide the plaintiff with hard evidence of the
risk-utility balance engaged in by the manufacturer. It thus may
enable the plaintiff to establish defect by the clear and convincing
standard. Professor Henderson cannot argue simultaneously that the
process defense is both impenetrable by the plaintiff and also dan-
gerous to the defendant. We believe we have set the proper balance
between plaintiff and defendant.
The final question that Professor Henderson poses is a pragmatic
one. Will manufacturers adopt the kind of documentation necessary
to make out the defense? He is right that a manufacturer will be
taking a serious risk. If he loses on the process defense, he has handed
the plaintiff the data to destroy him in the ensuing design defect
litigation. Our question to Professor Henderson is a simple one. What
are the alternatives? Are we to continue to try product liability cases
with the knowledge that the true facts are known only to the paper
shredder? Are we to look forward to several decades of dishonest
design defect litigation? This problem dwarfs polycentricity in terms
of its impact on the judicial system. Ultimately, if this information is
not voluntarily delivered, it will be mandated in some form by gov-
ernment. Our suggestion is that manufacturers be offered the entice-
ment of the process defense. We expect that courts will take the
16 Id. at 607-11.
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defense seriously and direct verdicts unless the higher burden for
defect is established. We hope that courts that are attuned to the
jeopardy of the manufacturers will be careful not to kill the goose that
laid the golden egg. If that care is not taken, we shall all be in deep
trouble because we shall have to admit that a Watergate mentality
governs products liability litigation.
CONCLUSION
We share many of Professor Henderson's concerns. They were
reflected in great measure in our proposal. We remain to be con-
vinced that a substantive standard of greater specificity for design
litigation is superior to the evidentiary standard that we have offered.
However, we are quite ready to incorporate Professor Henderson's
suggestion into the process defense.' 7 We remain firmly convinced
that our proposal has merit. It directs legal inquiry, for the first time,
to the nature of the decisionmaking process, rather than to the sub-
stantive decision that emanates from the process. We suggest that the
law ought to direct its attention to those aspects of product design
process to which the manufacturer can intelligently respond. We can
tell designers how to make good decisions much more easily than we
can convey to them that their marginally bad decisions do not meet
our approval. We have said it before and we will say it again: Good
process promotes good design decisions.
17 We urge legislatures to consider combining into one legislative package Professor Hender-
son7s proposed legislation with our process defense.
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